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We have seen a massive explosion in technologies, especially in molecular biology, that 
started affecting public health in the 0s and continues to accelerate. It’s a good time to 
discuss the impact that biotechnology will have on food safety, especially in my specialty 
of foodborne-disease surveillance. Many technologies—MALDI-time1 of flight mass 
spectroscopy, microarrays, sequencing, microfluidics, etc.,—are changing our concepts 
of microbial life, which is affecting how we detect and how we control microorganisms 
in their natural environments.
Each year, one out of every six Americans—48 million people—are thought to become 
sick with a foodborne illness, and 3,000 die. I’ll provide background on foodborne-disease 
surveillance, and what it does for us, and on some of the limitations of surveillance and 
the impacts of technology. 
The main points I will make are:
• Foodborne-disease surveillance is an important, but often overlooked, component 
of our food-safety system.
• How well it functions—or doesn’t function—is vitally important to industry and 
to the public.
• The current system operates at only a fraction of its potential.
• New technology can exponentially magnify its effectiveness.
Recent Outbreaks
00 started out with Salmonella Typhimurium infections reported from forty-one states, 
caused by human contact with African dwarf water frogs. In the same year, widespread 
salmonella infections were associated with shell eggs, frozen meals, alfalfa sprouts, Ro-
maine lettuce, and salami made with contaminated pepper, and E. coli O5 outbreaks 
were traced to beef and cookie dough. 0 is shaping up to be another banner year for 
foodborne disease.
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Prevention
Much can and should be done to prevent foodborne illness, from farm to fork: good 
agricultural practices, good manufacturing practices and inspections, designing processes 
for safety, microbial monitoring, restaurant and food-store inspections, and consumer 
education. However, in spite of everything we do, foodborne illness will occur because 
we are imperfect beings. Some 356 billion pounds of food are consumed annually in 
the United States and it’s impossible to monitor it all. Contamination, which can occur 
anywhere along the food chain, can’t be seen and is unevenly dispersed within the affected 
product. Accordingly, detecting pathogens in food is an insensitive process. On the other 
hand, essentially all of the food consumed in the United States is, in a way, being tested 
because it is being eaten, and disease surveillance provides information on what can be 
done to reduce the burden of illness. Furthermore, surveillance can help limit ongoing 
illness by recalls, public notices, and publishing of guidelines.
PulseNet
Figure  lists US recalls—some of which have been massive—in which PulseNet played 
a role in detecting outbreaks and averting disease. The much more profound impact of 
disease surveillance is that it allows identification of underlying problems and their solu-
tion, providing feedback to industry, to regulators and to consumers about problems that 
would otherwise be unrecognized.  
Figure . Largest US food recalls in which PulseNet played a prominent role.
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Figure . Addressing underlying problems.
Figure  shows a few of the industrial processes that, over the years, have been changed 
in order to reduce the burden of illness. And Figure 3 shows the result of a study done 
by Rob Tauxe at the CDC on recent outbreaks, showing vehicles that were not formerly 
realized to be risky and weren’t high on the “radar screens” at the FDA or USDA. Who 
would have thought that peanut butter would be a significant vehicle for salmonellosis, 
for instance, or that raw cookie dough could cause illnesses? These were picked up through 
our disease-surveillance system, allowing regulators and industry to direct their scarce 
resources towards where problems were actually occurring.
Figure 4 shows some ingredient-driven outbreaks, which, formerly, would have been 
difficult to identify. To a certain extent, the recent situation in Germany was ingredient-
driven; alfalfa sprouts are seldom eaten alone.
Figure 5 provides an illustration of the surveillance system. People become ill and visit 
their doctors who request stool samples and microbial cultures are sent to a laboratory. 
If a reportable pathogen is found, an isolate is sent to the Health Department for sub-
typing. Representatives of the Health Department interview cases to find out what they 
ate and what they were exposed to. When the information is uploaded to PulseNet, it is 
reported to the CDC. FDA and USDA and other organizations are involved in tracking 
the cases of disease, using the information to try to minimize the impact. Other modes 
of finding information are used also. There is a system whereby state health departments 
are called up with clusters that are recognized by physicians or the public, but Figure 5 
illustrates one of the more powerful methods that we have for discovering unrecognized 
problems in the food supply. 
Figure 6 shows what PulseNet does. Every state has a laboratory in a large city where 
these pathogens are sub-typed. Each lane has a pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
pattern that is investigated in local databases, then clusters of cases with matching patterns 
are uploaded and we look at them on a national scale at the CDC database. The regulatory 
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Figure 3. Selected recent multi-state outbreaks of foodborne infections (006–00):
new food vehicles (underlined).
agencies also contribute from their food-monitoring programs. Data from FDA are directly 
uploaded and those from USDA come indirectly through a network called VetNet. A new 
network is being formed in industry called Voluntary Net; companies are keeping their 
own inventories of PFGE patterns for rapid early detection of potential problems.
PulseNet USA comprises all fifty states, and several large counties and cities have 
laboratories that are connected electronically (Figure ). It started in 6 in Minnesota, 
and was officially opened in 8 by then Vice-President Gore. By 00, it was present 
in all fifty states. Each year some ,500 clusters are investigated at state and local health 
departments. About 50 multi-state clusters are examined by the CDC, of which ten to 
fifteen large, dispersed multi-state outbreaks are further scrutinized. At weekly meetings, 
we triage about fifty clusters and direct our resources accordingly.
PulseNet increases the sensitivity of cluster detection, strengthens the association be-
tween illness and exposure, and increases the speed of detection of outbreaks. It does this 
by amplifying the signal indicating ill cases. The number of patterns uploaded to PulseNet 
has stabilized at around 50,000 per year (Figure 8). The decrease in 00 resulted from 
the emergence of novel HN; some states had insufficient resources to investigate both 
flu and foodborne disease.

Figure 4. Selected recent multi-state outbreaks of foodborne infections
(006–00): ingredient-driven (underlined).
Figure 5. Pathogen-specific surveillance.
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Figure  provides an example of how it works. These are cases of E. coli O5H in 
Oregon in 006. Interviews of all of these cases showed a variety of exposures, whereas a 
subset, sharing a common PFGE pattern, revealed that these individuals had consumed 
fresh, bagged spinach. It is safe to say that, in the absence of this system, this outbreak—
 cases in twenty-six states, three deaths, and thirty-one cases of hemolytic uremic 
Figure 6. PulseNet electronic communication.
Figure . PulseNet USA.

Figure 8. Human specimen isolates uploaded to PulseNet USA
and identified clusters, 6–00.
Figure . E. coli O5:H, Oregon 6//006–0//006.
syndrome—would not have been detected. Each case of hemolytic uremic syndrome 
costs about a half-million dollars in medical expenses. A death has been costed at about 
$6 million. By comparison, the 0 sprout-associated outbreak in Germany resulted 
in 3,304 cases, thirty-eight deaths and 86 cases of hemolytic uremic syndrome. Adding 
the international cases associated with travel to Germany increases the cases of hemolytic 
uremic syndrome to 88, which is unprecedented.
Figure 0 provides another example of the signals received, this time for Salmonella 
Typhimurium over a 3-month period. Buried in these data were cases from around the 
United States that shared a PFGE pattern (Figure ). They were traced to peanut products 
that led to 3,000 different items being recalled.
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Figure 0. All Salmonella Typhimurium, //008–/5/008, weekly.
“Before” and “after” pictures are shown in Figure . The upper “before” picture is the 
epidemiologic curve from the Jack In The Box outbreak of E. coli O5 in 3, which 
took a long time to detect and resulted in many cases and four deaths. After seven weeks, 
50,000 hamburger patties were withdrawn. The lower “after” pattern, of a 00 outbreak 
of E. coli O5:H in Colorado, starts out looking similar whereas rapid detection led 
to early recall of hamburger meat and curtailment of the outbreak. This is an example of 
how PulseNet works and a hundred similar examples exist.
The theory underpinning PulseNet is that by detecting more outbreaks and curtail-
ing them, future disease incidence will be reduced. We have seen this occur with listeria 
(Figure 3). Subsequent to the initiation of PulseNet for listeria in the 0s, we detected 
more outbreaks, and, recognizing the roots of the problems, disease incidence fell. We 
have a long way to go with shiga-toxin-producing E. coli and salmonella, but every case 
of those diseases is potentially preventable; we need to work harder to reduce the burden 
of disease.
8
Figure . All Salmonella Typhimurium //008–/5/008, weekly;
JPXX0.88, JPXX0.85 and JPXX0.045 highlighted.
Figure . Foodborne outbreaks of disease caused by E. coli,
before and after PulseNet.
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Figure 3. Listeriosis in the United States, 8–008.
Bioterrorism
The only major act of foodborne terrorism in the United States occurred in 85, when—
to influence an election—members of the Rajneeshi sect in Oregon contaminated the 
salad bars of ten local restaurants with salmonella, infecting 5 people, of whom forty-
five received hospital treatment; all survived. The source of the infection took months to 
identify, whereas if it occurred today it would likely be detected and resolved quickly.
Global Surveillance
Our system is the most sensitive method for detecting unrecognized problems in our 
food supply—including from terrorism—with organisms that are under surveillance. 
PulseNet has been so successful in the United States that it has been adopted in many 
other countries. PulseNet International comprises eighty-four countries. The system in 
Canada is fully integrated with that in the United States. The Chinese have recognized 
the negative impacts that foodborne disease can have on trade and they are putting a lot 
of resources into PulseNet China. PulseNet Latin America and Caribbean is operational. 
However PulseNet Europe isn’t fully integrated because some of the countries there prefer 
to operate autonomously, and many of the counties in Germany act like independent 
states. A benefit from the recent E. coli outbreak in Germany may be a refocusing of effort 
in Europe on disease surveillance.
Food is a global issue. Meat, and ingredients in processed meat products, consumed 
in the United States come from all over the world. The importation of fruits, vegetables, 
meats and grains has been increasing with our free trade agreements. Even the components 
of bread come from abroad. Clearly, foodborne disease is a problem of global scope and 
has to be solved in a global manner.
Current Limitations
A number of limitations exist:
• We have minimal ability to control strain evolution.
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Figure 4. Case definitions for cluster detection and hypothesis generation/testing—.
• The system is inherently slow and at every outbreak the media question why it 
takes so long to get information.
• Exposure information is difficult to obtain.
• Effective surveillance is limited to pathogens we know and can detect.
Strain Resolution
Figure 4 shows a group of cases with a particular disease, some of whom are truly associ-
ated (“T”) or falsely associated (“F”) with a particular product in an outbreak setting. Of 
course, when cases are reported to the public-health authorities, it is never known what 
they have been associated with. And on the right of the figure is a measure of association 
that is used in case-control studies when looking at what exposures ill people (“case”) had 
vs. people who are not ill (“control”). This produces a statistical measure, the odds ratio 
(OR), which I will use to illustrate how sub-typing and case classification help strengthen 
the association between illness and exposure. If we limit our study to individuals who 
are more likely to have a common association—in other words if they share a fingerprint 
pattern in their pathogen—we eliminate cases that are more likely to be falsely associated 
than truly associated (Figure 5). This improves the proportions in our statistical analysis, 
and increases the strength of association between illness and exposure. For a more-strin-
gent case definition, we could use two PFGE enzymes instead of one (Figure 6A) and 
knock out some of the additional falsely included cases; however, we start knocking out 
truly associated cases as well. If we keep doing that and use, say, ten enzymes (Figure 
6B), then fewer cases are left and eventually confidence in the results becomes smaller 
with smaller sample size. Eventually, with whole-genome sequencing every case would be 
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Figure 5. Case definitions for cluster detection and hypothesis generation/testing—.
Figure 6. Case definitions for cluster detection and hypothesis generation/testing. 
A–two-enzyme PFGE case definition, B–ten-enzyme PFGE case definition,
C–whole genome sequence case definition.
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different from every other case and we would have 00% specificity and 0% sensitivity 
(Figure 6C), which would be as specific as you could have a case definition.
This relationship between sensitivity and specificity exists in all laboratory tests. At one 
end of the scale there is full specificity and zero sensitivity, whereas at the other end of 
the scale there is sensitivity with no specificity. Grouping together people who are sick, 
without knowing if they have salmonella or E. coli, would be a very inclusive case defini-
tion without specificity; it would be difficult to show an association between illness and 
exposure. We need to “move the bar” (Figure ) to get a strong signal that’s neither too 
specific nor too sensitive. It has to be somewhere in the middle, which is achievable by 
using a subset of our data or clustering algorithms, like tuning a radio by maximizing the 
signal and minimizing the noise. One of the impacts of new technology is fine tuning our 
signals. When we layer upon that different time intervals and geography, we can look at 
demographics. These can be done simultaneously in an automated fashion to have multi-
dimensional continuous analyses of surveillance data. This would not have been possible 
a few years ago because of the massive amounts of computing necessary. Soon we will be 
able to look at surveillance data exposure by exposure and ask the question, “Are any of 
these exposures potentially different from what we would expect?”
Slow System
Sick patients have to seek medical help and provide stool samples (Figure 8). The 
pathogens have to be cultured and identified. The cultures have to be shipped to the 
public-health laboratory. Each case has to get interviewed, and each culture has to be 
serotyped and sub-typed. This process can take anywhere from a few days to a few weeks. 
The most important part of the procedure is that interviewed cases must recall what was 
eaten approximately three weeks prior. It’s amazing that the system works as well as it 
Figure . Relationship between sensitivity and specificity.
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does. But recall drops off asymptotically with time. Ability to remember what was eaten 
three weeks ago is low, but it’s orders of magnitude lower after four weeks, five weeks and 
six weeks, and at some point reaches zero.
There is potential to shave off a substantial amount of time by developing laboratory 
tests that can be done directly when the isolate is identified. Sub-typing could be done 
in doctors’ offices and the results electronically communicated to PulseNet.
We are developing a rapid plate test for shiga-toxin-producing E. coli to simultaneously 
look at sero-type and virulence factors—whether it has shiga toxin, what type of shiga 
toxin, and whether other toxins are produced. And new tests are coming into clinical 
laboratories—where one would go to have an illness diagnosed—that are rapid and 
don’t necessarily need stool samples. Accordingly, we need a crash research program to 
change from PFGE to something else. Although PFGE works well, we need alternative, 
more-rapid options. Certain micro-arrays can generate data directly from the stool, and 
we are looking at the possibility of single-cell sequencing of DNA. Experts from around 
the world will confer with us in Atlanta in November, 0, to discuss technologies that 
will help us get at this problem.
Exposure Information
To identify an outbreak, we have two sources of information. The germs that made 
people sick and the interviews about what the people ate and what they did. We have 
discussed the technology that helps us get at the issue of the causal bacterium. Referring 
back to Figure 4, determining who is a “case” and who is a “control” is helped by the 
microbiological methods and PulseNet, but determining who was exposed and who 
was not exposed comes from the interview. Mathematically, from the × table (Figure 
4), they are equally important and we are starting to focus on refining this issue. We’ve 
Figure 8. The surveillance process: laboratory reporting takes time
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developed what we call OutbreakNet sentinel sites, of which there are, currently, five in 
the United States, with the goal of development of multiple models to serve the many 
systems used by states for:
• rapid collection of standardized exposure data,
• rapid laboratory testing (including PFGE),
• rapid cluster investigation, and 
• rapid product tracebacks and environmental assessments.
Some of this is technology-related and some not. A chief requirement is a commitment 
from government to follow up, as Minnesota does, on all of the cases to extract good 
information. The states have different political systems, with different issues to be ad-
dressed. Therefore, we are trying to develop different models that will work in different 
locations around the country. Ultimately, we want all of the states to function at a high 
level, whereas currently they are operating, on average, at about 5% of potential. It’s 
amazing what we have achieved at 5%, but what we could do if all states were operating 
optimally is astounding.
The FDA recognizes this and they are now emphasizing informational trace-backs 
(Figure ). When clusters emerge, they can start triangulating back on products through 
each case. Industry also needs to work actively at making their products traceable. In the 
produce industry, in particular, problems can result from commingling of products. The 
006 E. coli outbreak, linked to spinach, resulted in the whole industry going down for a 
long period of time. With a rapid trace back, the intervention could have been confined to a 
single farm in California. Industry is starting to recognize that it’s to everybody’s advantage 
to make products traceable and new technologies are being developed accordingly.
Figure . Epidemiology trace-backs.
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Figure 0. Etiology of acute gastroenteritis in the United States.
Pathogen Limitation
Surveillance is limited to pathogens that we know about. Data suggest that most foodborne 
pathogens fall into the “unknown” category (Figure 0). The bacteria that we track con-
stitute only 30% of those that cause gastroenteritis. PulseNet and OutbreakNet activities 
cover only about 3.5% of all the cases of foodborne disease.
What interventions would be possible if we knew what pathogens cause the other 
6.5% of cases? It’s hard to get at, but outbreaks of undetermined etiology present the 
possibility of finding out what’s actually making people sick. There are so many germs 
in the human gut, it would be very difficult to say which are causing disease. However, 
outbreaks provide a means for detecting pathogens and for triangulating them to the 
cause of the illness. When I worked in Minnesota, we did a national study of outbreaks 
of undetermined etiology and quickly found a number of new pathogens; this is worth 
pursuing nationally. 
By employing metagenomic analyses, it is now possible to examine every single germ 
in the human gut of every single case. It’s not easy or cheap, but it’s possible and it will 
become less expensive. We then look at each germ as a risk factor for disease through 
our statistical analysis. As mentioned, these new methods are changing the way we view 
germs. Each time we sequence the genome of a germ, we find additional genes, with only 
about 3,000 genes stably present. It appears that, in nature, germs maintain only part of 
their genetic potential in their cells. The other genes are in the community and the cell 
can access different qualities as they need them. It’s an efficient way of evolving. This is 
exactly what we saw in the recent sprout-associated outbreak in Germany. The pathogen 
picked up new factors to help it adapt to a new niche. Not only will we be able to detect 
new pathogens, we will be able to detect the potential for outbreaks of disease like that 
in Germany by understanding not just the individual germ, but the whole system and 
its potential to cause harm to humans. 
8
Scientists in approximately a hundred groups around the world are sequencing all of 
the strains from Germany and comparing those that cause hemolytic uremic syndrome 
to those that don’t, with virulence studies in animals. It will be one of the most studied 
germs in history, thanks to new technology. There are now elegant new ways of looking 
for new types of germs. Using metagenomic techniques, Ian Lipkin found a putative cause 
for colony collapse disorder that affects honey bees. Handheld metagenomic devices now 
are coming onto the market that will allow us to identify new pathogens more quickly.
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